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Article
Introduction
Much has been made in recent years of the role of social 
media as a core means of political communication during 
election campaigns. As readership of the mainstream printed 
press has steadily decreased (Stanyer, 2007), political actors 
have sought to fill the gap in their communication linkages 
with voters and, as a result, new media platforms such as 
Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram seem to provide the oppor-
tunity to fill this void. While the analysis of Facebook and 
Twitter has enjoyed a significant amount of attention from 
political scientists, particularly toward the latter (Di Fraia & 
Missaglia, 2014; Hermans & Vergeer, 2013; Jürgens & 
Jungherr, 2015; Lassen & Brown, 2011; Lilleker & Jackson, 
2011; Vergeer & Hermans, 2013; Zittel, 2009), evaluations 
of the use or impact of Instagram have, until very recently 
(see, for example, Eldin, 2016; Larsson, 2017a; Russman & 
Svensson, 2016) been very much ignored. Moreover, much 
of what has been analyzed in relation to Instagram has been 
centered on how individual candidates use the platform 
(Lalancette & Raynauld, 2017; Liebhart & Bernhardt, 2017; 
Muñoz & Tower 2017) with very little being made of how 
political parties themselves use the application (Filimonov, 
Russman & Svensson, 2016).
Taking the 2015 and 2016 general elections in Spain as a 
case study, this article contributes to this void and explores 
the use of Instagram as a tool of electoral communication by 
political parties, opposed to party candidates (Abejón-
Mendoza & Mayoral-Sánchez, 2017; Quevedo-Redondo & 
Portalés-Oliva, 2017). Given the exploratory state of research 
into Instagram use among political actors, the three main 
research questions are as follows: Did political parties in 
Spain use Instagram during the 2015 and 2016 election cam-
paigns and to what extent? Did party use of Instagram appear 
to seek a clear strategic goal? Which features of party posts 
yielded higher levels of engagement with Instagram users? 
To answer these questions, the publications of the four main 
political parties in Spain are subjected to content analysis 
adopting the tools designed by Russmann and Svensson 
(2016) to identify whether parties used Instagram as a means 
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of (a) promoting their top candidates, (b) broadcasting their 
policy positions, or (c) mobilizing their supporters. The 
resulting output of this coding as well as variables capturing 
core features of the Spanish parties is then applied in a mul-
tivariate regression analysis to examine what variables are 
associated with higher levels of engagement by Instagram 
users with the parties’ posts.
Consistent with existing findings regarding the use of 
Instagram elsewhere (Bossetta, 2018; Selva-Ruiz & Caro-
Castaño, 2017), the results show that the use and level of 
engagement witnessed by underdog challengers and political 
entrepreneurs was significantly higher than those of tradi-
tional mainstream parties. Moreover, the use of Instagram by 
entrepreneurial parties displayed an identifiable strategic 
purpose that was absent from traditional parties. The right-
of-center challenger party, Ciudadanos, shows a clear prefer-
ence for promoting the image of the main party candidate, 
while the left-of-center challenger, Podemos, elected to focus 
on mobilizing its supporters.
The main contribution of this article to existing work on 
Instagram use is twofold. First, it represents the first assess-
ment of Instagram use by official Instagram accounts of polit-
ical parties in Spain across two national election cycles. The 
results of the analysis find that there are some noteworthy 
distinctions between how Instagram is used by the accounts 
of the Spanish political parties in comparison to findings 
regarding the use of Instagram by Spanish party candidates 
(Marcos-García & Alonso-Muñoz, 2017). Second, the analy-
sis presented here ties in with existing work on the use of 
Instagram in another European and party-centered political 
system using the same methodological framework as that 
used in the assessment of partisan use of Instagram in the 
Swedish case (Filimonov et al., 2016). By replicating the 
methodological approach used across political systems with 
similar characteristics, the understanding of partisan use of 
Instagram can be extended in a comparative context.
This article continues as follows. I provide a discussion of 
the rising importance of social media as a means of political 
communication and highlight the main affordances offered 
by Instagram for political parties. Subsequently, I engage 
with a discussion of the existing literature assessing the use 
of Instagram by political actors and highlight the framework 
of analysis to be used in line with the guidelines provided by 
Russman and Svensson (2016). I then provide a description 
of the data collection and coding procedure before entering 
into a discussion of the main results.
Theoretical Framework
Our first point of discussion is why the study of the political 
use of Instagram is an important unit of analysis that merits 
investigation. In June 2016, the number of active Instagram 
(2016) users, those who use the application on a weekly basis, 
surpassed the number of active users on Twitter reaching a 
total of more than 500 million, of these some 300 million use 
their accounts at least once every day. This total has reached 
even greater heights in 2017 with the social media company 
boasting a total of 700 million active users, making Instagram 
the second most widely used social media platform after 
Facebook. Since Instagram attracts in surplus of 700 million 
users worldwide, allowing them to share and promote material 
at little cost, it would seem rational for political parties to want 
to take advantage of this communication tool. Moreover, as 
parties have had difficulty in reaching out to young people and 
motivating them to engage with and participate in politics 
(O’Toole, Marsh & Jones, 2003; Quintelier, 2007), it is under-
standable why parties would seek to communicate with this 
demographic using the media platforms that they are most 
likely to frequent (Xenos & Foot, 2008). Indeed, carrying out 
interviews with political party candidates using social media 
as part of the campaign efforts, Enli and Skobergø (2013) find 
that attempting to communicate with young people is an often-
cited motivation behind political use of Twitter and Facebook. 
Of note is that the authors find that both self-identified motiva-
tions as well as observable content in candidates’ posts seem 
geared at mobilization efforts. While not focused on Instagram, 
there is a clear rationale for parties to engage with social media 
in general as a means of broadcasting to the electorate and 
driving their vote-maximizing (Downs, 1957) objectives, par-
ticularly among the young, so it is reasonable to expect parties 
to echo the same behavior across a new social media platform 
that has emerged as popular platform among the population.
Within the context of an evolving hybrid media environ-
ment (Chadwick, 2013), where traditional mediums, such as 
the printed press and television, operate alongside both 
online media outlets and social media: direct user-generated 
content from social media has the potential to interact with 
traditional sources (Lalancette & Raynauld, 2017) as well as 
aid the communication of ideas beyond the restrictive edito-
rial controls of the “gatekeepers” (Skovsgaard & Van Dalen, 
2013). Being able to “speak” directly to their voters as well 
as the wider electorate is a motivation behind social media 
use among political actors that has been identified in survey 
responses (Karlsen & Enjolras, 2016).
However, as noted by Bossetta (2018), given the asymmet-
ric digital features of social media applications, different social 
media platforms provide distinctive affordances (Bucher & 
Helmond, 2018) for political communication, and therefore, 
one should be weary of aggregating the potential benefits of 
“social media” into the same category. Practically, the techni-
cal affordances of Instagram for parties is to allow them to 
communicate with a large proportion of the electorate via the 
publication of user-generated media content that can be easily 
engaged with in the form of likes, comments, and shares. The 
rising use of Instagram use among the electorate also incentiv-
ises the application’s use for parties vis-à-vis less popular 
social media alternatives too. The higher-level affordances 
(Bucher & Helmond, 2018) are the product of these technical 
features, which include the ability to present persistent and 
visible material free of third-party interpretation in a persistent 
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and instantaneous way. Instagram is the only social media 
platform whose original focus was the sharing of photos with 
the role of the images as a core tool in communication strate-
gies being well noted. Images have been observed to be more 
effective at capturing the gaze of spectators in marketing cam-
paigns (Fahmy, Bock, & Wanta, 2014) and within the field of 
political communication, images are more effective at estab-
lishing the political agenda, harnessing emotive responses, 
and communicate political messages in a more concise man-
ner (Schill, 2012). In other words, “images often supersede 
words” (Lalancette & Raynauld, 2017, p. 3). Indeed, recent 
analysis of Instagram use across a number of political contexts 
reveal a number of interesting findings. Of note is that the 
image-driven content of the platform makes the posts made by 
political actors easily diffusible across other platforms within 
the hybrid system (Lalancette & Raynauld, 2017) with the 
material shared by political actors on Instagram itself shaping 
and driving the political punditry observed over televised 
media outlets. Moreover, because the digital architecture of 
Instagram facilitates the sharing of images originating on the 
application across other platforms such as Twitter and 
Instagram (Bossetta, 2018), political candidates are able to 
ensure that there is a visibly observable cohesion between the 
material they post across different mediums (Liebhardt & 
Bernhardt, 2017).
Moreover, the potential communicative power of an image 
that expresses a policy stance or ideological position is far 
greater than a generic statement of support. Indeed, as 
Lalancette and Raynauld (2017) argue in their analysis of 
the Instagram material of Canadian president, Justin Trudeau, 
the presentation of a physical image of the president taking part 
in a gay pride parade is a far more powerful communication of 
the president’s egalitarian stance on issues of lesbian, gay, 
bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) rights than could be achieved 
without a photograph. As a result, Instagram with its focus on 
image sharing, functions for political actors as a low-cost, eas-
ily transferable, interactive, fluid, and spontaneous tool that 
facilitates the communication of powerful, personal, and poten-
tial distance-reducing messages to the electorate.
One criticism made of the relevance of social media as a 
tool for political electioneering is that there is a process of 
self-selection involved whereby only members of the elec-
torate who choose to “follow” a particular political party’s 
online account are the ones being exposed to the political 
messages being published so that, in effect, the parties are 
communicating their campaign messages and soliciting sup-
port from their own supporters (Norris, 2003). A popular 
term used to refer to this self-selection bias of engagement 
on social media networks is “echo chambers” (Garrett, 2009; 
Sunsteain, 2007), a term which seeks to depict the fact that 
social media users tend to only engage with other users that 
share the same interests and beliefs as each other. Indeed, 
empirical evidence of Twitter and online blog use (Aragón, 
Kappler, Kaltenbrunner, Laniado, & Volkovich, 2013; 
Hargittai, Gallo, & Kane, 2008) provide support for this 
argument. While self-selection is indeed an important part of 
the Instagram user interaction, through the functions of the 
social media platform itself, political messages have the 
potential to move beyond their active follower base and pen-
etrate additional users’ feeds. Should any Instagram user 
interact with a party’s post by either liking or commenting on 
the publication, this action will have a number of knock-on 
effects that increase the exposure of this post. Members of 
the social network of this same user, additional Instagram 
participants who follow this user, will be able to see any 
interaction activity that this user exercises, thus providing 
them with a direct link to the party’s material even if they do 
not themselves follow the party’s account. In addition, 
Instagram also routinely promotes popular publications on 
the explore tab (Bossetta, 2018) and user account profiles 
from the interactions of one’s own social network and from 
those in close geographical proximity, again increasing the 
possible exposure level of political party publications beyond 
their own supporter groups. As Vissers (2009) found in a 
study based on the role of official campaign websites, this 
means that parties are able to “preach through the converted” 
(own emphasis) in addition to the already converted. It has 
also been argued that such interpersonal interactions and 
communication between already like-minded members of 
the same community play a more critical role in the forma-
tion of persuasive political arguments (Norris, Curtice, 
Sanders, Scammell, & Semetko, 1999, p. 6) thus demonstrat-
ing the potential political utility available via Instagram.
The infiltration of political messaging into apolitical 
spaces, in this case the virtual space of a social media plat-
form which was designed to facilitate the sharing of user-
created images, lessens this self-selection bias as users are 
restricted in their capacity to limit their exposure to political 
messaging that may infiltrate into their news feeds. In addi-
tion, it is clear that the ability to select the content that a user 
is to be exposed to does not remain within the complete con-
trol of the Instagram user themselves and political parties 
may use certain hashtags that are more likely to cover a 
wider catchment area and thus increase the likelihood of a 
user being shown the party’s material. Support for this argu-
ment can be found in Utz’ (2009) study on the 2006 Dutch 
general elections, showing that politically disinterested citi-
zens had a greater likelihood of being exposed to the political 
campaigns of parties on social media websites than they 
would be on more traditional webpages. Thus, while echo 
chambers may exist in the same vein that they do across all 
forms of media conduits,1 social media networking applica-
tions do provide for the penetration of these chambers despite 
a lack of active volition on behalf of the user, underlining 
their potential power as an important and effective tool for 
political communication.
Having established an understanding of the core affor-
dances of Instagram to political actors and rationalizing the 
incentives for them to use the application in the face of its 
rising popularity among the public, there is a strong 
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expectation that parties in Spain will use Instagram as part of 
their wider communication strategy. In Spain, parties com-
pete in multi-member districts with closed party lists and 
parliamentarians are elected via proportional representation. 
A total of 350 parliamentary seats are divided between 52 
electoral districts depending on their population size and, 
with the exception of the autonomous cities of Ceuta and 
Melilla which only have one seat, all other districts have a 
minimum of at least two. Political campaigning is highly 
centralized, party-dominated, and more and more reflects a 
presidentialised and personalistic election campaign style 
(Magone, 2009) where the top candidate serves as the main 
public face of the party. It is not common practice for candi-
dates on the party list or even for party members to carry out 
their own independent campaign activities (apart from per-
haps local elections), and the concept of door-to-door can-
vassing is unheard of. Social media thus serves the potential 
function for parties and candidates in Spain of increasing the 
perceived proximity between candidates and their potential 
voters by facilitating direct interaction between the two.
Instagram use in Spain is also very much on the rise. 
Mirroring global trends, electoral survey data shows that 
Instagram is the second-most widely used social media 
application after Facebook. In general, social media has the 
potential to be an efficient influencer in political campaigns 
in Spain. For the cohort of young people aged 18–24, 53% of 
them claimed that they used social media as their main source 
of information regarding parties and candidates during the 
December 2015 election period.2 This figure, while the larg-
est percentage noted of all of the age categories, is sizable 
and is surely reflective of the likely trajectory of future parti-
san campaign efforts aimed at young people in Spain. Since 
social media represents a sizable portion of the campaign 
source material for young people and since Instagram is the 
second-most popular social media platform in the country, 
Spanish parties are clearly incentivised to promote their 
campaigns on Instagram. Moreover, Spain has recently been 
marked by a high level of political volatility which has 
resulted in the transformation of the party system and the 
emergence of new political parties which are challenging the 
dominance of the bipartisan status quo. Given the consensus 
regarding the superior fluency of political underdogs with 
social media platforms (Bossetta, 2018), there is an increased 
likelihood that the new parties emerging in Spain will pro-
vide impetus for parties across the system to respond to the 
electoral incentives of Instagram use. Given the strong 
potential of Instagram for electoral ends, what uses have 
been observed in the political uses of the application?
To date, the analysis of the use of Instagram as a means 
of political communication by political parties is very much 
still in its infancy. The first study was completed by Eldin 
(2016) who analyzed the impact of electoral advertisements 
placed on the Instagram platform during the 2015 election in 
Bahrain. Eldin’s study relied on the collection of data from 
individual questionnaires that were administered to young 
people to judge whether members of the country’s youth had 
been exposed to these advertisements with extremely high 
numbers responding affirmatively. The study also found that 
more than 60% of respondents received information either 
about a party’s program or candidate(s) via the Instagram 
application. The article chose the effects of paid-for adver-
tising on the application as the unit of analysis rather than 
the use of typical user-generated published content. Thus, 
the impact factors claimed here are not representative of 
typical Instagram user account activity but rather a commer-
cialized advertisement facility. Moreover, these results dem-
onstrate Instagram’s reach as a means of political 
communication, yet it does little to display how parties 
themselves use the platform nor how users respond to par-
ties’ material. Are posts orientated at communicating their 
program or ideas, promoting the image of their candidates, 
or for mobilizing their own supporters in a Get Out the Vote 
(GOTV) effort? Since a Downsian (1957) understanding of 
political parties perceives them to be vote-maximisers, it is 
reasonable to assume that partisan communication efforts 
on Instagram might echo electoral efforts made elsewhere 
that seek to ensure their supporters are mobilized to turnout 
on election day.
One study (Filimonov et al., 2016; see also more gener-
ally Russmann & Svensson, 2016) does, however, lay the 
groundwork for an assessment of party postings on Instagram, 
in particular as a means of analyzing the strategic motiva-
tions behind party content. The authors used the 2014 
Swedish elections as a case study to analyze the content of 
party posts to make conclusions as to what purpose Instagram 
use might afford them. Coding the content of political party 
posts, the authors found that Instagram use tended to focus 
on promoting the party message (penned broadcasting) as 
opposed to other objectives found to be common on other 
social networks such as to mobilize the electorate (Anduiza, 
Cristancho, & Sabucedo, 2014; Vaccari, 2013). The authors 
also found that promotion of the main party candidate formed 
a large part of the, if however limited, number of publica-
tions. In Sweden, Instagram use represented some form of 
cohesion within the wider communication campaign of par-
ties, with the study’s coding system capturing references to 
other campaign material and the promotion of official cam-
paign images within the Instagram platform demonstrating 
Instagram use’s incorporation within the hybrid media sys-
tem. This study, while an important first step in the assess-
ment of party use of Instagram is limited in terms of its 
generalisability in that it captures the observations within 
only one election cycle within only one country. In seeking 
to replicate the framework of analysis completed by 
Filimonov et al. (2016) and advocated by Russman and 
Svensson (2016), this article has the potential to extend the 
external validity of their main findings within another party-
centered European polity allowing for a comparative under-
standing of the strategic purposes behind partisan use of the 
social media platform.
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In the Spanish case, the earliest studies on the impact of the 
Internet and social media on Spanish politics focused on polit-
ical party websites (Dader, 2009), and now include numerous 
assessments of party use of Twitter (Aragón et al., 2013) and 
Facebook (Abejón-Mendoza & Mayoral-Sánchez, 2017). 
More recently, emerging literature has initiated analysis on the 
political use of Instagram, with a particular focus on the 
Instagram accounts of Spanish MPs (Selva-Ruiz & Caro-
Castaño, 2017), mayoral candidates (Quevedo-Redondo, 
Portalés-Oliva, & Berrocal-Gonzalo, 2016), and those of the 
party leaders both during (Marcos-García & Alonso-Muñoz, 
2017; Quevedo-Redondo & Portalés-Oliva, 2017) and outside 
of (López-Rabadán & Doménech-Fabregat, 2018; Selva-Ruiz 
& Caro-Castaño, 2017) moments of electoral competition. 
The predominant finding of all these studies is that candidate 
accounts using Instagram are very much focused on promot-
ing the personal image of the candidate themselves with the 
majority of posts presenting him or her within the public 
sphere in a geographic place of relevance to the political arena 
and fulfilling their formal role as candidate/politician. The 
Spanish candidates’ posts on Instagram, therefore tend to mir-
ror the behavior observed by candidates from other political 
contexts (Lalancette & Raynauld, 2017; Muñoz & Tower, 
2017) as well as Spanish candidates’ activities across other 
social media platforms (Quevedo-Redondo et al., 2016). The 
dominance of the candidate(s) self-promotion might not be 
transferable to posts of the parties given the highly party-cen-
tered structure of the Spanish political system. In the 
Norwegian context, for example, Karlson and Enroljas (2016) 
find that top-level candidates focus more on party-orientated 
as opposed to individual-orientated posts with the latter being 
negatively associated with user engagement. In the Spanish 
context, then, political party Instagram accounts may be more 
likely to echo alternative focuses such as that observed by 
Filimonov et al. (2016) on general party broadcasting, or that 
observed elsewhere (Anduiza et al., 2014; Gibson, 2015; 
Karlsen & Enjolras, 2016) on mobilizing supporters. Despite 
the functions of social media platforms allowing for a multi-
directional flow of interaction between political parties and 
candidates with the electorate, existing explorations of social 
media use have displayed that systems such as Twitter tend to 
be used in line with the uses of traditional media platforms, 
that is unidirectional information sharing from the political 
party to the electorate (Criado, Martínez-Fuentes, & Silván, 
2012) with the same conclusion being drawn from the use of 
Instagram (Abejón-Mendoza & Mayoral-Sánchez, 2017; 
Bossetta, 2018; Lalancette & Raynauld, 2017). There is there-
fore, consensus, regarding the unidirectional communication 
of Instagram by political parties with the initial work of 
Filimonov and colleagues (2016), with parties being observed 
to use the social media principally as a means of talking to, as 
opposed to with, their supporters and the general electorate. 
This makes us return to the original question, if parties are 
using Instagram to communicate with the electorate, does their 
use of the platform as a tool for communication display any 
systematic trends that might allow one to infer the strategic 
purpose of its use? Applying the framework utilized by 
Filimonov et al. (2016), this article will analyze the material 
posted by political parties to assess whether there is an observ-
able strategy with there being an expectation that parties will 
publish posts that seek to (a) promote the image of their main 
candidate, (b) broadcast their positions to the electorate, or (c) 
seek to mobilize their supporters. Understanding to what 
extent parties in Spain use the application and inferring to 
what ends they do so, one might then consider what predicts 
successful partisan engagement on the platform.
Data and Method
The study aims to assess three main questions regarding the 
use of Instagram in the 2015 and 2016 elections. To that end, 
our main research questions were as follows: To what extent 
did Spanish political parties use Instagram during the 2015 
and 2016 election campaigns? Did partisan use of Instagram 
appear to seek a clear strategic goal? How did users respond?
This study relies on a content-analysis of posts from the 
Instagram accounts of the four main political parties in both 
the 2015 and 2016 election campaigns. Up until the 2014 
European Parliament elections, Spanish party politics has 
been marked by a strong bipartisan divide which has now 
been undermined by the introduction and success of new 
challenger parties (Cordero & Montero, 2015; Orriols & 
Cordero, 2016; Rodon & Hierro, 2016): the left-wing 
Podemos (We can) and the center-right Ciudadanos 
(Citizens). The parties under consideration in this study are 
the four largest parties in Spain and includes the two tradi-
tional parties, Partido Popular (PP) and Partido Socialista 
Obrera Español (PSOE), as well as the two new challenger 
parties, Ciudadanos and Podemos. The Instagram accounts 
analyzed for these parties were those linked to the official 
party website: the fact that these accounts were even embed-
ded on the websites of the parties is already an indicator of 
the level of significance parties give to the use of Instagram 
as a tool for promoting their online presence. Of note is that 
in the United Kingdom, for example, none of the three main 
national political parties, the Conservatives, Labour, or the 
Liberal Democrats, have any direct link to their Instagram 
accounts on their party website at the time of writing.
Content analysis of the posts, defined as both the actual 
picture contents as well as the accompanying caption pro-
vided by the party (but excluding the content of comments), 
was carried out on publications made in the four weeks prior 
to the election including the election day itself. For the 2015 
election, content was analyzed that was posted between 
November 15th and December 20th inclusively, while for the 
2016 election material posted between May 22nd and June 
26th was analyzed. In addition to photographs, Instagram 
allows for the publication of short videos. These were not 
included in the content analysis to ensure uniformity of com-
parison, although it should be noted that the decision to only 
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include photographs does not significantly change the num-
ber of observations included as no party had posted more 
than two videos during the timeframe under analysis indicat-
ing that photographs are the preferred media type that parties 
tend to publish on the platform. This is a result echoed else-
where (Bossetta, 2018).
A total of 135 posts were made by the four parties in the 
2015 election campaign with 86 being made during 2016. 
Given the overall small N, all of the posts published by the 
political parties were submitted to content analysis, thus the 
posts included in the analysis represent that of the total popu-
lation of posts made during the final four weeks of campaign-
ing. The coding of the content analysis was completed 
manually by the author since computational means of ana-
lyzing Instagram data was not available (Bossetta, 2018). 
The reliability of the coding was confirmed by submitting a 
random sample of 10% of the posts (N = 20) to coding by a 
graduate research assistant using the same codebook.
The variables included in the coding of posts draws upon 
the framework and method advocated by Filimonov et al. 
(2016) and Russman and Svensson (2016). While a wider 
coding guide of Instagram image has been applied else-
where (Liebhardt & Bernhardt, 2017), the reduced frame-
work provided by Russmann and Svensson is adopted here 
because it caters to the needs of the specific research ques-
tion. That is, capturing the potential strategic motivations 
behind political party use of Instagram. A summary of the 
coding variables included in the analysis is provided in 
Table 1A (see Appendix).
Broadcasting is penned by the authors of the Swedish 
study as a variable that captures the transmission of informa-
tion to the electorate regarding “political opinions, positions, 
statements and performance to the voters” (p. 5). The defini-
tion of broadcasting provided in the present study has been 
designed using a more limited definition. The indicator used 
in the former study can be considered too broad, effectively 
capturing for the communication of range of different types 
of information—this is arguably why their study reported 
such high levels of broadcasting, reaching 100% in the case 
of some of the parties they analyzed. In the present study, a 
post by a party on Instagram was only coded as largely 
broadcasting if it articulated a clear and explicit policy 
stance. Where policy positions were implied, or more generic 
supportive statements were made without stating a specific 
policy proposal, these posts were identified as slightly broad-
casting. To provide an illustrative understanding of the dif-
ferences between broadcasting values, representative 
examples of posts identified as broadcasting are provided in 
the Appendix (Figures 1A to 7A).
As political party use of other social media platforms has 
evolved in line with the growing population of the electorate 
that also uses these applications, so too has the effectiveness 
of their use. A growing consensus has begun to emerge that 
shows that party campaigning on Twitter and Facebook can 
lead to voter mobilization (Anduiza, Gallego, & Cantijoch, 
2010; Krueger, 2002; Quintelier & Vissers, 2008). With 
regards to the use of mobilization strategies via social media 
in Spain, this is a phenomenon that has proven particularly 
effective as the adoption of Twitter as a medium for diffusing 
political discontent and organizing large-scale political activ-
ism by the 15-M (and later Indignados) movement between 
2011 and 2013 (Anduiza et al., 2014). In this present study, 
mobilization is a variable that captures a party’s intent to rally 
a specific action from the electorate. Posts were coded as 
largely mobilizing if they contained explicit requests for 
action to be taken by the electorate. This includes invitations 
to vote, suggestions to follow the party (or other accounts 
associated with the party) on additional media platforms, 
opportunities to attend an event, or to tune into a media 
debate. Where posts contained generic rallying cries such as 
“Let’s do this” or “We can do it,” these posts were categorized 
as being slightly mobilizing. Examples of posts identified as 
mobilizing are included in the Appendix (Figures 8A to 13A).
Posts were coded to identify the presence of the top candi-
date from each party as the main object in the post’s image. 
The incumbent president Mariano Rajoy was the main candi-
date of the governing PP with Pedro Sánchez being presented 
as the main candidate of the opposition party, PSOE. Albert 
Rivéra and Pablo Iglesias were the respective main candi-
dates of Ciuadanos and Podemos. In the case of Podemos’ 
feed in the 2016 election, the appearance of either the 
Podemos party leader, Pablo Iglesias, or the leader of 
Izquierda Unida, Alberto Garzón, was coded because of their 
agreement to form a pre-electoral coalition in the June elec-
tions. Under the current climate of politicians-as-celebrity, 
Thompson (1995, p. 136) argues that glimpses into the pri-
vate life or intimate moments of politicians have become a 
core feature in constructing a candidate’s image and identity. 
The use of social media likely facilitates this perceived inti-
macy as politicians are able to represent themselves in quotid-
ian and relatable scenarios (Stanyer, 2007). Empirical 
evidence displays, however, that these strategies are not 
applied uniformly by political candidates, with some present-
ing images of themselves centered purely on them performing 
their political functions (Lalancette & Raynauld, 2017; 
Muñoz & Tower, 2017) and others operating in the private 
sphere (Selva-Ruiz & Caro-Castaño, 2017). For this reason, 
an indicator was included to capture such images and encoded 
a post as representing a private image if the top candidate was 
presented in a behind-the-scenes context or when shown out-
side the context of an official party or campaign event.
Furthermore, variables that were adopted to capture the 
content of posts included an indicator to note the presence of a 
celebrity figure in the post’s image, whether or not the post 
was a produced image using official party and/or campaign 
branding, and whether or not the post referred to other cam-
paign media (hybrid). One additional content variable included 
here that was not present in the Swedish study was the exis-
tence of Europeanisation, here defined as any reference to the 
European Union (EU), the actors that operate within the EU or 
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actors from the same transnational party to which the domestic 
party belongs. It was hypothesized that, since recent literature 
has shown that the role of the EU has begun to have a greater 
impact on domestic political competition (Hernández & 
Kriesi, 2016), we might expect parties to make reference to 
these issues in their social media activity.
In order to capture how users of Instagram responded to the 
publications made by parties, the number of likes and engage-
ment scores were included. Users of the Instagram application 
can respond to content by providing a heart-shaped “like” icon 
to material they approve of, the total number of likes the post 
receives is then displayed alongside the post itself. The total 
number of likes a post received at the time of coding was 
recorded and for engagement scores, both the number of likes 
and comments a post were considered. Importantly, the deci-
sion to like a post is purely representative of a user’s approval 
of a publication, while comments allow users to express a 
more heterogeneous response. Although the content of com-
ments was not systematically coded in this study, it was appar-
ent that comments reflected both positive and negative 
responses from users, justifying the need to distinguish 
between likes and engagement.
Muñoz and Tower (2017) operationalize engagement as 
the sum of the number of likes and comments. Here, I argue 
that such a method of measuring engagement is method-
ologically flawed because it fails to capture the asymmetric 
cost to users of liking and commenting on posts. Because 
the cost of making a comment on a post is higher than hit-
ting the like button, it requires more effort and time on the 
part of the user, comments are considered to be weightier 
indicators of user engagement. In order to provide some 
accommodation for the greater significance of comments 
vis-à-vis likes, engagement scores were weighted to include 
the sum of the number of likes and two times the number of 
comments. The number of likes and comments recorded 
here are those that posts had on the date of coding (April 
2017) rather than at the time of the publication of the posts 
themselves. News feeds on the application that display 
posts from the accounts that users follow, however, con-
stantly refresh with the most up-to-date information. For 
this reason, the recorded likes and engagement scores are 
still likely to be representative of their reception and inter-
action by users at the time of the actual publication and any 
lag effect across time is assumed to be equal across parties 
and therefore any significant differences between the post-
ings remains the same.
Using these scores as the dependent variables, a series of 
multivariate regression models are run with the results of the 
content analysis forming the main explanatory variables in 
order to analyze the impact of different post characteristics 
on the effectiveness of party material. The results of the con-
tent analysis and the statistical models are reported in the 
following two sections.
Instagram Use in Spanish Elections
At the time of collecting the content data from the Instagram 
accounts of the Spanish parties, the number of followers 
(Instagram users that subscribe to the publications of a par-
ticular account) were as follows: the new parties Ciudadanos 
and Podemos had 29,800 and 59,300 followers, respec-
tively; in the traditional bloc, the PP had only 18,400 while 
the PSOE had 14,400. With just looking at this descriptive 
data regarding the number of users who receive automatic 
updates from parties’ accounts, it is clear that the new par-
ties, Ciudadanos and Podemos, grossly outperform the two 
traditional parties, PP and PSOE, in their efforts at attract-
ing followers.
The distribution of posts across parties in each election is 
reported in Table 1. A total of 221 posts were made by the 
Spanish political parties during the two election campaigns: 
135 posts were made during the 4 weeks prior to the 2015 
election, with a smaller number of 86 being made in 2016. 
The use of Instagram seems to have been pointedly more 
prominent by the new challenger parties as opposed to the 
two traditional parties. The number of posts made by both 
Ciudadanos and Podemos, competing in national elections 
for the first time, is far greater than that made by either the 
PSOE or the PP, the main opposition and governing party, 
respectively. This is not surprising as new parties often rely 
more on online media platforms because of a lack of access 
to traditional means of communication (Bossetta, 2018; 
Larsson, 2017a; Owen, 2017). This is even more so in the 
case of Spain where access to airtime on television is regu-
lated and dependent on the vote share of the party in the 
previous election.
Table 1. Political party postings and average interaction scores.
Political party 2015 2016
 Publications n (%) Likes Engagement Publications n (%) Likes Engagement
Ciudadanos 28 20.74 876.07 931.50 38 44.19 1067.03 1113.48
Podemos 64 47.41 711.59 764.47 30 34.88 2041.83 2182.17
PP 7 5.19 578 682.57 16 18.60 903.81 1123.06
PSOE 36 26.66 472.06 497.61 2 2.33 609.5 842.50
Total 135 100 674.90 723.70 86 100 1366.07 1481.74
PP: Partido Popular; PSOE: Partido Socialista Obrera Español.
8 Social Media + Society
The number of likes and level of engagement is also sig-
nificantly more and is discussed further in the following sec-
tion. On average, posts by Ciudadanos in 2015 were the most 
successful in terms of engaging Instagram users, achieving 
an average number of likes and engagement score of 876 and 
931 respectively.
Undoubtedly, the party with the weakest use of the plat-
form was the PSOE. While they were not the party that made 
the fewest publications, across both elections they received the 
lowest engagement score. In the case of the PP, the party dou-
bled the number of publications, the majority of which were 
official glossy campaign images, between the two campaigns 
yet the total number of posts made by the party in both cases 
remains so low that no statistical comparison is viable. What 
appears to be a lackluster attempt at the use of Instagram by 
the two traditional parties, accumulating around only a third 
and a fifth of the total number of publications between them in 
2015 and 2016 respectively, is perhaps representative of the 
lack of consideration of Instagram as a legitimate tool for elec-
tioneering among the traditional bloc.
The priority given to Instagram by the new parties as rep-
resented by their higher frequency of use in comparison to 
the traditional parties may be explained by the demographic 
targeting of these parties. Orriols and Cordero (2016) pre-
sented evidence to show that there was a clear generational 
divide in voting for new parties and old parties in the 2015 
elections, with the former being favored by the Spanish 
youth. Moreover, data reported in the CIS’ post-election sur-
veys in both 2015 and 2016 show that young people remained 
the demographic group most susceptible to political persua-
sion in Spain, with just over half (50.5%) of 18- to 24-year-
olds claiming that they decided who to vote for at some point 
during the official campaign period in 2015. This figure was 
less in 2016 at only 37%, but still represents the biggest 
group of undecided voters in that election too. The same 
group claimed that social media sites were their biggest 
source of information related to the parties and the candi-
dates (53% in 2015 and 36.6% in 2016). Of note is that 
54.5% of the young respondents in the 2016 post-election 
study used Instagram which was the second most popular 
social media platform only to Facebook, surpassing the 
usage of the frequently studied Twitter. As there is a tendency 
for the PP to be most popular among the oldest in Spanish 
society (39.4% of their 2016 vote share came from those 
aged 65 and above, with less than 5% their votes coming 
from young people), the incentives of prioritizing Instagram 
posts as an electoral tool would have been limited and this 
may explain why the party strategy toward the application 
seemed minimal if, in fact, existent. However, as discussed 
earlier, in the case of the 2015 elections at least, the tradi-
tional parties were able to enjoy a far larger amount of access 
to the regulated airtime than that available to the new parties. 
The potential incentives, therefore, of both reach as well as 
supporter demographics afforded by Instagram vis-à-vis 
media alternatives are reduced for traditional parties.
A rival justification for the new party dominance may be 
afforded by the desire to achieve the so-called “multiplier 
effect” (Copsey, 2003; March, 2005). As access to traditional 
sources of media is more restricted for new parties, these 
same parties have a harder time of displaying their relevance 
as significant political players within the domestic party sys-
tem. One strategy that has been adopted by parties to aug-
ment their significance and multiply their perceived size has 
been to flood social media platforms such as Twitter with 
high volumes of content, thus creating a higher number of 
interactions which emits the impression that they are a larger 
political force than they may actually be. This, however, 
seems unlikely in the case of Instagram use by Spanish par-
ties as the difference in the average daily number of publica-
tions does not provide evidence for such a systematic or 
coordinated approach to the platform. The average number 
of posts per day was relatively low at around four.
December 18th, the final day of official campaigning in 
2015, is the day that recorded the most activity from all par-
ties, with a total of eleven publications being made. On the 
final day before the election, the PSOE was the only party of 
the four to make any posts on Instagram. What is surprising, 
however, is the choice of material to publish taken by the 
PSOE. While the other three parties’ final posts before elec-
tion day were oriented toward objectives to mobilize the 
electorate or to promote their top candidate, the PSOE publi-
cations were of seemingly random everyday objects such as 
socks and plants in the color red, red being the color associ-
ated with the socialists. Interestingly, the trend in the number 
of publications does not coincide with dates of importance 
for activity occurring offline. Analysis of the use of Twitter, 
for example, has displayed that the number of posts on the 
day of the televised debates was substantially more than on 
other days (Di Fraia & Missaglia, 2014; Larsson, 2017b). 
This is not the case in either of the election cycles examined 
here as shown in Figures 1 and 2.
An additional observation of interest, at least in the 2015 
case, was the use of Instagram on the so-called “reflection 
day.” Spanish electoral law requires that the official cam-
paign end on the Friday before polling day (Sunday) to allow 
the electorate a day of quiet reflection and to consider the 
proposals of the competing candidates. Social media is 
exempt from these regulations and parties seem to have con-
tinued posting on this day in 2015. Because the 2016 case 
records levels of no Instagram activity from the parties on a 
number of days other than the reflection day; it is unclear 
whether or not the lack of activity in 2016 is merely coinci-
dental or not.
The purpose of the content analysis of the pictures and 
their captions was to assess the motivations of party use of 
Instagram, the results of which are shown in Tables 2 to 4.
One of the clear conclusions that can be taken from the 
content analysis is that no party displayed a pattern of 
Instagram use that reflects an ambition to promote party pol-
icy on the social media platform. The articulation of policy 
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positions was only slightly clear in the case of the PP during 
the 2015 elections but even then, the results do not suggest 
any systematic trend that may allow for the inference of 
motivations. In fact, the number of posts by the PP are so few 
that it would be somewhat of an overreach to claim that the 
party’s behavior of Instagram represents any strategic utili-
tarian value for the party.
Capturing attempts for the parties to mobilize specific action 
from the electorate displays that Podemos is the only party that 
expressed some form of mobilizing reference across the major-
ity of their publications during both election cycles. As the 
foundation and development of Podemos emerged from that of 
the former 15-M/Indignados political activist groups, which 
displayed strong use of social media for mobilizing (Anduiza 
et al., 2014; Fernández-Albertos, 2015), it may be that Podemos 
sought to replicate these uses on Instagram. Mobilization 
attempts to activate the party faithful may also represent 
Podemos’ view of social media as tool for communicating with 
their own supporters as opposed to persuading undecided vot-
ers. This would be in line with the political communication 
strategies whose main purpose is often to rally the troops rather 
than persuade the masses (Norris, 2003; Vaccari, 2013).
Undoubtedly, Ciudadanos is the only party that decided 
to aggressively use Instagram as a conduit to promote the 
Figure 1. Daily Instagram usage in 2015.
Dotted lines mark the date of the televised debates.
Figure 2. Daily Instagram usage in 2016.
Dotted lines mark the date of the televised debates.
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image of their top candidate. It is the only party that 
increased both their number of publications across the two 
elections as well as their posts of their main candidate. It 
seems probable that Ciudadanos sought to take advantage 
of the popularity of the party leader, Albert Rivéra. The pre-
electoral CIS survey in 2015 revealed that the leader of 
Ciudadanos received the most favorable assessment of the 
four candidates for the presidency by the electorate, a result 
that was widely reported in the press at the time. In the case 
of Podemos, the decrease in the number of posts of their 
leader, Pablo Iglesias, and the marginal number of photos 
of Alberto Garzón in 2016 were, however, balanced out by 
an increase in the number of publications by the party that 
showed Inigo Errejón, Podemos’ effective number two. The 
fact that all parties bar Ciudadanos reduced their posts pro-
moting the main candidate in the second election cycle may 
be explained by the overall decrease in popularity for all of 
the individual candidates after their failure to form a gov-
ernment after the 2015 elections.
Analysis of the posts found very little evidence of any 
Europeanisation effect, with the only exception being a very 
small number of posts from Ciudadanos. This may be due to 
the lack of salience regarding the EU in Spanish electoral 
competition (Vazquez-García, 2012, p. 119), and is not to say 
that other case studies should expect to find similar results. 
Interestingly, while the Europeanisation variable proved 
somewhat insignificant in that it returned only four EU refer-
ences from Ciudadanos out of the 220 observations analyzed 
across the two elections, the number of EU-related publica-
tions from this same party seems to be numerous outwith the 
limitations of the timeframe selected for analysis here. Both 
the feed of the official Ciudadanos Instagram account and that 
of Albert Rivéra display ample posts with other sister party 
leaders belonging to the same European party group (ALDE) 
Table 2. Broadcasting of party policy.
Political party 2015 2016
 Not broadcasting Slightly 
broadcasting
Largely 
broadcasting
Not broadcasting Slightly 
broadcasting
Largely 
broadcasting
Ciudadanos 14 (50%) 12 (42.86%) 2 (7.14%) 31 (81.58%) 7 (18.42%) 0 (0%)
Podemos 26 (40.63%) 30 (46.88%) 8 (12.50%) 21 (70%) 7 (23.33%) 2 (6.67%)
PP 2 (28.57%) 4 (57.14%) 1 (14.29%) 12 (75%) 2 (12.50%) 2 (12.50%)
PSOE 30 (83.33%) 5 (13.89%) 1 (2.78%) 2 (100%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%)
Total 72 (53.33%) 51 (37.78%) 12 (8.89%) 66 (76.74%) 16 (18.60%) 4 (4.65%)
PP: Partido Popular; PSOE: Partido Socialista Obrera Español.
Table 3. Electoral mobilization.
Political party 2015 2016
 Not mobilizing Slightly mobilizing Largely mobilizing Not mobilizing Slightly mobilizing Largely mobilizing
Ciudadanos 16 (57.14%) 4 (14.29%) 8 (28.57%) 30 (78.95%) 5 (13.16%) 3 (7.89%)
Podemos 26 (40.63%) 27 (42.19%) 11 (17.19%) 10 (33.33%) 10 (33.33%) 10 (33.33%)
PP 5 (71.43%) 0 (0%) 2 (28.57%) 9 (56.25%) 4 (25%) 3 (18.75%)
PSOE 22 (61.11%) 10 (27.78%) 4 (11.11%) 2 (100%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%)
Total 69 (51.11%) 41 (30.37%) 25 (18.52%) 51 (59.30%) 19 (22.09%) 16 (18.60%)
PP: Partido Popular; PSOE: Partido Socialista Obrera Español.
Table 4. Top candidate promotion.
Political party 2015 2016
 No candidate Candidate present No candidate Candidate present
Ciudadanos 5 (17.86%) 23 (82.14%) 4 (10.53%) 34 (89.47%)
Podemos 37 (57.81%) 27 (42.19%) 22 (75.33%) 8 (26.67%)
PP 3 (42.86%) 4 (57.14%) 9 (56.25%) 7 (43.75%)
PSOE 29 (80.56%) 7 (19.44%) 2 (100%) 0 (0%)
Total 74 (54.81%) 61 (45.19%) 37 (43.02%) 49 (56.98%)
PP: Partido Popular; PSOE: Partido Socialista Obrera Español.
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and captions on other posts make reference to policy debates 
going on in other member states. The fact that Ciudadanos, as 
one of the two new parties in the Spanish political system, is 
the only party which shows any kind of Europeanisation 
effect is noteworthy. There may be reason to suggest that in 
the same way that European Parliament elections provide a 
legitimizing effect for emerging parties (Hix & Marsh, 2007; 
Shulte-Cloos, 2018), as was the case with Podemos, perhaps 
engagement with European and transnational party actors is 
also carried out as a means of legitimizing the party 
(Bressanelli, 2012; McDonnell & Werner, 2018). An addi-
tional explanation may be that appearing alongside these 
same actors allows the electorate to better place the party 
within the traditional ideological axis. As has been argued 
above, new parties suffer from lack of recognition and appear-
ing alongside generally recognizable figures such as the 
leader of the ALDE, Guy Verhofstadt, whose pro-European 
videos have often been viral material for social media users, 
serves as a proxy for voters in their attempts to identify where 
Ciudadanos stands vis-à-vis their competitors. This line of 
enquiry would provide for an interesting avenue of research 
as the same behavior does not seem to be witnessed by 
Podemos, the other new party in Spain. One possible hypoth-
esis may be that the challenge of Ciudadanos in placing itself 
within the Spanish system has proven to be more difficult in 
that its position as a purely centrist party (Rodríquez Teruel & 
Barrio, 2015) doesn’t fit well with the typical polarized party 
positions of the Spanish system (Magone, 2009).
Spanish Parties on Instagram. What 
Works?
In the following section, I move beyond a description of the 
different posts made by parties and the motivations of the 
same and begin to analyze those characteristics that explain 
party success on Instagram. Increasing the level of engage-
ment of posts on Instagram is important for political par-
ties. First, politicians claim (Karlsen & Enjolras, 2016) and 
are observed (Abejón-Mendoza & Mayoral-Sánchez, 2017) 
to be using social media platforms such as Instagram to 
make sure that they are present and forming part of the con-
versation that is going on online; at the core of their strat-
egy is to make sure that they are the topic of conversation. 
Engagement in the form of the number of likes as well as 
comments on Instagram are important performance indica-
tors that will communicate to parties how they are being 
received on the application. Moreover, in addition to the 
chronological structuring of user feeds on Instagram, the 
explore page uses algorithmic allocations (Bossetta, 2018) 
based on how popular posts are as indicated by how many 
likes and comments they receive. Therefore, the higher the 
level of engagement received on a party’s post, the greater 
the likelihood that the posts will be promoted to networked 
users via the explore page. In short, then, engagement mat-
ters for two reasons: it signals to the party how they are 
received, and it also promotes the party’s material beyond 
its core block of follows.
Using the number of likes and engagement scores 
described above as the dependent variable, a multivariate 
regression analysis is conducted regressing the dependent 
variables on the core coding variables used in the content-
analysis. In addition, two binary variables are included to 
indicate new party status (Ciudadanos and Podemos) as well 
as whether a party was left-leaning (Podemos and PSOE) or 
right-leaning (Ciudadanos and PP). Three estimations are 
completed: one independent estimation for each of the elec-
tion periods under analysis as well as a pooled ordinary least 
squares (OLS) model including a control for year effects. 
The results reported in Table 5 display the impact of vari-
ables on the natural logarithm of the likes and engagement 
scores, although a reproduction of the OLS estimation using 
the raw data is provided in the Appendix and finds results of 
both a similar impact and significance.
As displayed in Table 5, there are a number of interesting 
findings of note. Being a new party (either Ciudadanos or 
Podemos) is associated with both achieving greater number 
of likes and generating higher engagement. The coefficients 
are positive and reliable across all models despite a lack of 
statistical significance at conventional levels in the 2016-
only estimation. This lack of significance is likely explained 
by the impact of the left-wing dummy which is significant 
and positive in 2016. Because Podemos made up 94% of left-
wing party posts made in 2016, this variable is effectively 
capturing party newness. In the pooled model, newness rep-
resents the largest coefficient value of all statistically signifi-
cant variables meaning that challenger party status had the 
biggest substantive impact on how Instagram users responded 
to party material. While positive in 2016, the effect of being 
in a left-wing party displayed the reverse effect in 2015 with 
the relationship displaying a negative association with both 
likes and engagement. The individual significance of this 
variables falls away in the pooled model.
In terms of how content impacted Instagram users’ 
engagement with the party publications, the use of official 
branded material, or appearing alongside celebrities did not 
have any noticeable effect. The negative coefficients of the 
broadcasting variable indicate that users of the social media 
application did not tend to react particularly positively to 
posts that sought to promote party policy. It is clear, how-
ever, that posts that sought to mobilize the electorate did pro-
vide a significantly more positive response. The same is also 
true for the promotion of the top party candidate. In the 
pooled model, the size and significance of these variables is 
the same meaning that party posts that seek to get Instagram 
users to take action or those that display images of their top 
candidates are statistically more popular than other posts.
The limitation of this present analysis, however, is that the 
impact of the engagement with Instagram users displayed 
here may not necessarily be linked with changes in users’ 
views and or behavior. An interesting line of research may 
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seek to assess whether posts that seek to mobilize voter 
responses are effective at actually triggering the desired 
response, namely in terms of turning out the vote. Moreover, 
the very small N of observations pertaining to the traditional 
parties, particularly in the case of the PSOE, compared with 
the challenger parties means that some of the estimated effects 
presented in the OLS models above may not reflect their true 
impact. As parties make more systematic use of the social 
media application, however, a more equal distribution of 
posts will likely be made by the parties. This is something that 
could be reassessed in future election cycles. Nevertheless, 
the results presented here do provide for an initial understand-
ing of which parties in Spain are the most proficient users of 
Instagram and what content tends to resonate well with the 
Spanish electorate who use the application.
Conclusion
The daily use of the application by the four main parties in 
Spain across both elections shows that political parties are 
actively innovating their communication strategies to keep 
up-to-date with an ever-evolving political communication 
market. A simple analysis of the extent of the parties’ use 
shows that the new challenger parties of Podemos and 
Ciudadanos have been both the most active and indeed the 
most popular users of the photo-sharing social media plat-
form. Of note is the reduction in the use of the platform 
between the two election cycles with a significantly lower 
number of publications being made during the second round 
of elections, arguably the result of electoral fatigue with two 
general elections taking place in the country within six months.
The guiding hypotheses supposed that Instagram posts 
would reflect party communication strategy that focused on 
promoting (a) the party’s policy positions, (b) electoral mobi-
lization, and (c) the image of the main party candidate. 
Content analysis of the publications made by the parties 
across both elections provides for mixed results that reflect 
the heterogeneous development of party uses for Instagram. 
No party seems to have used Instagram as a means of sys-
tematically communicating their policy positions with refer-
ences to the same remaining limited across both election 
cycles. Podemos remains the only party that tended to use 
Table 5. Modeling engagement with party posts.
2015 2016 Pooled model
 Likes Engagement Likes Engagement Likes Engagement
New party 0.253*** 0.241*** 0.269 0.112 0.344*** 0.294***
(0.0850) (0.0907) (0.204) (0.213) (0.0720) (0.0784)
Leftwing –0.184** –0.185* 0.562*** 0.593*** 0.120 0.116
(0.0923) (0.0993) (0.117) (0.116) (0.0746) (0.0776)
Broadcasting –0.213*** –0.204*** –0.0468 –0.0545 –0.146*** –0.138**
(0.0602) (0.0624) (0.0914) (0.0985) (0.0557) (0.0572)
Mobilization 0.180*** 0.183*** 0.172*** 0.182*** 0.207*** 0.215***
(0.0583) (0.062) (0.0495) (0.0511) (0.0439) (0.0463)
Top candidate 0.259*** 0.297*** 0.180* 0.183 0.208*** 0.230***
(0.0936) (0.0993) (0.100) (0.113) (0.0754) (0.0793)
Private image 0.227 0.188 –0.200* –0.221* –0.194 –0.230*
(0.230) (0.240) (0.109) (0.112) (0.127) (0.134)
Celebrity 0.324 0.377 0.00192 –0.0104 0.176 0.164
(0.228) (0.240) (0.207) (0.214) (0.310) (0.344)
Hybrid –0.267** –0.257* –0.107 –0.111 –0.143 –0.140
(0.128) (0.138) (0.146) (0.148) (0.108) (0.113)
Branded –0.118 –0.122 –0.174 –0.198 –0.125 –0.122
(0.0930) (0.0974) (0.173) (0.185) (0.0819) (0.0851)
EU 0.606*** 0.560*** –0.0639 –0.0392 0.0277 0.00544
(0.122) (0.128) (0.253) (0.265) (0.292) (0.291)
Year (2016) 0.676*** 0.704***
 (0.0700) (0.0724)
Constant 6.278*** 6.321*** 6.552*** 6.743*** 5.960*** 6.034***
(0.114) (0.125) (0.179) (0.189) (0.0958) (0.103)
Observations 135 135 86 86 221 221
R2 0.340 0.327 0.573 0.529 0.497 0.476
EU: European Union.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1.
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Instagram as a means of mobilizing its supporters with a 
majority of its publications aimed at inspiring support or spe-
cific action from voters in 2015 and again in 2016. One of the 
most evident findings was the focus of Ciudadanos on the 
promotion of their lead candidate, the extent of which far sur-
passed the promotion of the lead candidates by any of the 
other parties. This finding, echoes that of candidate’s use on 
Instagram with Abejón-Mendoza and Mayoral-Sanchez 
(2017) highlighting that the Facebook page of Rivera tended 
to focus on images of himself, 77% of all posts, at a rate 
much higher than that of the other candidates. Analysis of the 
traditional parties does not show any identifiable strategic 
utility to their Instagram use and the low level of participa-
tion on the platform vis-à-vis their new competitors is likely 
indicative of either their inability to understand the incen-
tives and affordances of Instagram for political communica-
tion or the result of their ability to monopolize and focus on 
traditional means of communication in light of electoral 
regulations that restrict access to the same for emerging 
political challengers.
In terms of explaining the successes of party use of 
Instagram, overall the new challenger parties of Ciudadanos 
and Podemos tend to be the most efficient users. Being a new 
party is associated with both an increased number of likes as 
well as a higher engagement score. Of note is that the strong 
correlation between belonging to the bloc of new parties and 
achieving a greater level of engagement with Instagram users 
echoes the findings presented by Selva-Ruiz and Caro-
Castaño (2017). Focusing on the accounts of individual MPs 
from the main parties, their analysis reveals that the mean 
level of engagement (number of likes and comments) is far 
superior among MPs from the two new parties compared 
with those published by MPs from the PSOE and the PP. The 
findings contradict, however, the claims made by Marcos-
García and Alonso-Muñoz (2017) who argue that the main 
candidates of the old parties are the most active, if, however, 
not the most successful at gaining engagement.
A party’s ideological leaning does not appear to exhibit 
any effect on influencing the level of engagement with 
Instagram. The results of the regression analysis also show 
that posts that seek to mobilize voters or promote the main 
party leader play more positively with the electorate than 
posts that seek to promote party policy. As such parties may 
wish to consider focusing their Instagram use on these two 
functions should they wish to increase their impact on this 
particular social media platform.
The biggest limitation of this study is the small number of 
electoral cycles in Spain that we can apply a systematic review 
of Instagram use to. The application itself as well as its use by 
political parties as a tool of political communication is very 
much in its infancy. Analysis tracing the trends in party use of 
the picture-sharing platform to include future elections across 
time will provide data for a more robust assessment, although as 
noted by Bossetta (2018), the digital architecture of Instagram is 
evolving at a fast pace meaning that longitudinal analysis will 
need to consider how changes in the interface and tools of the 
platform may impact upon how parties use it in practice. This 
contribution is one of only a very limited number that assesses 
within country data. As more empirical evidence emerges from 
other national level assessments, so too will our capacity to 
make more generic claims regarding the use, and indeed bene-
fits of, Instagram for political party electioneering. Given the 
methodological constraints on providing comparative analysis 
across countries due to the longitudinal evolution of the applica-
tion’s tools, the next European Parliament elections due to take 
place in May 2019 would provide fertile ground for a compari-
son of Instagram use by political actors across a large cohort of 
countries that take place simultaneously.
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Notes
1. Concerns about a self-selection process arguably apply in 
equal measure, if not more, to traditional media forms operat-
ing in the hybrid communication system in that most printed 
outlets have some form of political leaning and thus readership 
tends to reflect the ideological positioning of the newspaper. 
The same can also be said for television news outlets whose 
behavior better reflects an objective of consumer satisfaction 
rather than information spreading (Brants & Neijens, 1998).
2. All electoral survey data are taken from the 2015 and 2016 pre- 
and post-electoral surveys at the Centro de Investigaciones 
Sociológicas (CIS) databank. Available at http://www.cis.es 
/cis/opencms/ES/index.html
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